More recently Rosenberg has suggested compellingly,`M edical, health and population geographers share many of the same theoretical and methodological strengths, weaknesses, and frustrations. We should not be afraid to continue to follow the well-worn paths which constitute the majority of what we do, but have rarely done together. ... How to broaden the paths into one lane is a challenge which medical, health, and population geographers are going to have to confront ... '' (1998, pages 220^221, our emphasis) . The hopeful upshot is that differences in method or epistemology somehow can be combined, harmonized, or reconciled as a means forward. These beliefs are so attractive because the alternative may be the fragmentation of an already small subfield of human geography, where scholars broadly interested in similar topics at best talk past one another, and at worst cannot engage with each other's work.
Of course, this sort of debate resonates throughout the discipline more broadly. Therefore, we take inspiration from a notable attempt at working within the broader disciplinary impasse between scientific and poststructural geographies which was recently offered by Dixon and Jones (1998) . Staging a mock debate between these two types of geographers, they deftly outline the difficulty in harmonizing or reconciling the two perspectives. Their paper is telling insofar as it shows that this sort of``trenchant divide'' (page 247) is not easily bridged because it is not just a matter of method or ontology. It is deeply epistemological, and these different philosophical orientations thereby affect the nature and aim of scholarship. For scientific geography (with its foundational epistemology), an ultimate stability between reality and representation is presumed, which therefore sanctions methods that positively reveal patterns and associations as geographies. Poststructuralism is not an alternative method, but an alternative epistemology. Its theory of knowledge rejects the faith in a mirror correspondence between representations and reality and so its aim is not to represent, but to critique all representations for their inevitable hubris, irony, and silences (Rosenau, 1992) . This orientation means its scholarly projects have different objects and aims from modernist social science, but most importantly it has a different relationship with knowledge ö which makes any attempt at reconciling or harmonizing it directly with spatial science impossible. Nevertheless, Dixon and Jones (1998) argue that critical insight can be sparked by their close juxtaposition. In other words, although the debate cannot be resolved, working within it can produce insight and clarify the debate.
In this paper, therefore, we work within the divide between medical and postmedical geography in order to temper some of the enthusiasm that has built up around the possibility of solving or transcending debates in medical and health geographies. Our purpose is to explore this issue of reconciling medical and postmedical geographies, within the space of a single paper and around a specific research issue: where people die. Through most of the 20th century (and in contrast to the previous one), the modernist trend in the United States has been away from dying at home and towards dying in the institutional setting of the hospital (Brim et al, 1970; Lerner, 1970; Palmer, 1993) . By 1980, just over 60% of deaths in the USA were nosocomial (1) (Field and Cassell, 1997, page 39) . Statistical evidence from Washington State, however, suggests a reversal of that spatial pattern, away from hospital and towards the home (and nursing home). Thus, our question seems a timely and important venture to explore in an ongoing intellectual debate.
As a somewhat experimental piece of writing, the paper is divided into four sections. A brief review of the literature on location of death is offered to situate the research on site of death.
In the next section we analyze data from Washington State
(1) Of, or taking place in, the hospital. death certificates: (a) to document the spatial shift over time, and (b) to test variables which have been argued in the literature to be correlated with home death. This research is then critiqued and deconstructed in the next section of the paper in three moves: first, the analysis is criticized for its complicity with the biomedical model; second, it is faulted for its inability to move beyond statistical explanation towards more robust social-theoretical understanding and interpretation based on social processes; and third, a series of key crises of representation are exposed with the aid of Derridean critiques of pharmakon and logocentrism. We then offer some critical reflections on the paper, focused on the intellectual and political rationales, and effects of the juxtaposition, of two very different ways of producing geographic knowledge. Here we stress that this paper does not bridge or`solve' the divide between medical and postmedical geographies, but we try to work within the debate itself (cast as a juxtaposition) in order to produce scholarly, ethical, and political insights.
Who dies where?
The topic of death location at the microscale typically has not been in the geographers' purview. Rather, studies that examine death site derive from the health sciences, where the import of death sites is directed to questions of improvement of care, rather than to understanding death as a social process. Nevertheless, there seems to be a growing recognition of this elision of spatiality (for example, Corless, 1988; Field and Cassell, 1997; Tolle et al, 1999) , which also provides an entry for our research on the grounds of the literature.
To review the health-sciences work on microlocation of death, we draw heavily on a recent extensive and exhaustive review of this literature by Grande et al (1998) , as well as more recent work (for example, Tolle et al, 1999) . Canvassing some forty-four studies from Europe, North America, and Australia, Grande et al identify a general consensus around two sets of clinical and nonclinical, or demographic, variables that are most often associated with dying at home. Causes of death that increased the likelihood of home death include: heart and vascular diseases (Cartwright et al, 1973) , bronchitis (Bowling and Cartwright, 1982) , and cancers in general but especially gastrointestinal and genitourinary ones (Clifford et al, 1991; Constantini et al, 1993; Hunt et al, 1993; Johnson and Oliver, 1991; McClusker, 1983; McClusker and Stoddard, 1987) . Other important clinical variables that are positively correlated with home death include the availability of acute-care hospital beds in the decedent's area (Pritchard et al, 1998; Tolle et al, 1999) , a low degree of need for symptom-control measures such as equipment, technology, or intricate drug regimes (see Powers and Burger, 1987) , and length of survival time from diagnosis (Dunphy and Amesbury, 1990; Hunt and McCaul, 1996; Komesaroff et al, 1989; McClusker and Stoddard, 1987) .
The presence of an informal caregiver, and the decedent being male, younger, and of higher socioeconomic class are the nonclinical factors that correlate positively with home death according to this literature (for example, Bradshaw, 1993) . The association between home death and informal caregiving is the most consistent theme in the literature. Thè informal caregiver' was most often operationalized as a spouse (Cartwright et al, 1973; Clifford et al, 1991; Constantini et al, 1993; Dunphy and Amesbury, 1990; Hunt and McCaul, 1996; Komesaroff et al, 1989; McClusker, 1985) , though there were other measures: a partner (Hunt et al, 1991) , not living along (Greer et al, 1986; Mor and Hiris, 1983; Powers and Burger, 1987; Seale and Cartwright, 1994) , and number of (adult) children (Hunt et al, 1989; . In several studies it was noted that this caregiver tended to be a woman, which resonated with the fact women tended to die at home less often than men (Bowling and Cartwright, 1982; Clifford et al, 1991; Hunt et al, 1989; Rosenberg and Short, 1983; Seale and Cartwright, 1994) . Age was often negatively correlated with home death, however, with several studies suggesting that the elderly are less likely to die at home than are younger people (Cartwright et al, 1973; Clifford et al, 1991; Eve et al, 1997; Hunt et al, 1991; Seale and Cartwright, 1994) . Cartwright et al (1973) also noted that home death was rare for people under the age of 45 years, and that people aged between 45 and 54 were most likely to die in the home. Generally, middle-aged adults seem to have a greater likelihood of dying at home than younger or older persons. Socioeconomic status only appeared to predict home death when the cause of death was some form of cancer. By highlighting the often lengthy span of the terminal phase of cancer, Grande et al (1998) followed Seale (1991) who argued that cancer generally influences the likelihood of home death because it often kills younger people, symptoms are different, and there is often a recognizable and lengthy terminal phase of the illness. The relationship appears to be positive, though class has been operationalized in a wide variety of ways in the various studies, from education level (Constantini et al, 1993) to occupation (Sims et al, 1997) to ecologically by area of residence (McClusker, 1983; Rodder et al, 1987) . Considering all causes of death, however, socioeconomic status does not seem to be related to home death in any consistent manner.
To turn specifically to our immediate context of Washington State, two papers have examined site of death here (Moinpour and Polissar, 1989; Polissar et al, 1987) . Polissar et al use state death certificate data from 1968 to 1981 (and we draw on its coding schemes wherever possible for the sake of consistency). Their analysis of factors influencing place of death in Washington State for all causes of death from the late 1960s to the early 1980s suggested that a slight majority of deaths (51%) took place in hospitals. Only 16% of deaths occurred in the home; 23% were located in nursing homes, and 9% in other places. This spatial pattern remained largely consistent over the study period. There was, however, a slight increase in home deaths towards the end of the study period, which the authors recognized as a point for future analysis. They found that home death was most associated with divorce and with cardiovascular (including stroke), heart and vascular diseases. The largest percentage of home deaths by age was for the cohort aged 55^64 years, and the elderly were especially unlikely to die at home. Though women were less likely to die at home overall, gender was not related to home death when controlled for by other variables. This is in contrast with findings elsewhere (see above). In the later study, Moinpour and Polissar (1989) examined data from a state cancer registry database for several Western Washington counties between 1980 and 1985. They found that some form of hospice care greatly increased the likelihood of home death. Other variables positively associated with home death included marital status, and rural residency. They also found a negative relation between home death and the age cohorts of infancy (age less than 1 month) and of the elderly (age 85 years or more).
From this literature, two gaps emerge that we seek to fill with our analysis. First, various strands of geographic research have ignored the question of location of death at the microscale. Although the health-sciences literature has examined the question, and agrees upon several variables of interest, it theorizes site of death largely from a caregiving or health-policy orientation. Second, although there has been research in our area of interest (Washington State) it is now growing dated. In order to begin theorizing about the microgeographies of death and dying, an updated examination is warranted to establish the current spatial pattern. For these reasons we introduce this project on home death by taking the preliminary steps of (1) documenting the recent spatial pattern of deaths in Washington State, and (2) modeling home deaths with available demographic data in order to offer a microgeography of death in Washington State, and with reference to earlier local and international literature.
Home death in Washington State
Following the argument developed above we draw on the same data source as Polissar et al (1987) in updating the geography of death and dying in Washington State, in order to detect change. (2) For our data set, we used the Washington State Department of Health Statistics file containing the official death certificates of the population for the state from 1980 to 1997. These data were used because they are the most valid and reliable picture of death for all residents in this state (N 677 780). Additionally, the file contains specific locational variables for site of death. The earliest available year of the database was 1980, and 1997 was the most recent year for which data were available. We counted only those people who both lived and died in Washington State itself, leaving us with a sample size of 636 811. Records with missing death-site data reduced this figure to 636 647 decedents. Variables extracted from the certificates were: year of death, sex, marital status, age at death, cause of death, facility type, location of residence, occupation, and education level. For`facility type', the site of death in Washington is coded on the death certificate as``hospital'',``home'',``nursing home'',`i n transit'', or``other''.
Recall that previous literature guides us to focus attention on the availability of informal caregivers, age, gender, cause of death, and geography. In this data set, marital status was the only information that could be used to probe caregiving. Age cohorts were duplicated from Polissar et al (1987) , and we included four 10-year cohorts between 35 and 74 years of age in order to capture a range of adult life-course stages in and around`middle age'. Coding for geography proved especially difficult. Data on counties and localities (cities and towns) were fairly comprehensive, but when finer classifications were used, too many data points were missing for the series to be useful. We dummy coded decedents' residential and death location as urban or rural, based on US Census designation. (3) This is in accordance with previous work in Washington State (Moinpour and Polissar, 1989 ), but it is also an element of the data structure where localities are coded either as incorporated cities or as rural areas of a county.
Trends in location of death
Our most important finding from this research is that there has recently been a rise in the percentage of home deaths in Washington State. (4) First, figure 1 (see over) compares site of death from 1980 through 1997. In 1980 only 17% of Washingtonians died at home. By 1997 the percentage had risen gradually, yet steadily, to 26.8%. Expressed another way, if we calculate a likelihood ratio on the actual numbers of home deaths in 1997 compared with 1980 (see table 1, over), Washingtonians were 1.8 times more likely to die at home in 1997 than they were in 1980. Likewise, there was a 7.2 percentage-point increase in nursing-home deaths between 1980 and 1997. In contrast, there has been a rather sharper decrease in hospital deaths from 53.7% in 1980 down to 36.0% in 1997. Again expressed as likelihood, in 1980 Washingtonians were 2.1 times more likely to die in hospital than in 1997 (see table 2, over). The decrease began around 1982^83 and continued to 1995, after which the trend appears to flatten. There is a point of change in 1992, with the decline in hospital death (2) Unlike Moinpour and Polissar (1989) , we did not have access to a second data set on cancer deaths, which they used to consider the effects of several clinical variables on place of death. decreasing at an increasing rate and, inversely, home deaths increasing at an increasing rate.
Second, we can say there has been a rise in home deaths when we compare our study period with an earlier one (Polissar et al, 1987 ) (see figure 2). From 1968 through to 1981, the proportions of decedents across the different sites of death in Washington varied (see figure 2); rates were steady, and the numbers of home deaths especially low. If we compare the overall percentages between the two study periods (table 3) , we can see that the percentage of deaths in the home has increased. Clearly there has been a rise in the percentage of home deaths between the two study periods. Thus, there has been a distinct trend towards home death, away from hospital death, from 1980 to 1997. This pattern contrasts with the rather steady proportions between different death sites in Washington between 1968 and 1981. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 Figure 1. Percentages of decedents at each site of death in Washington State, 1980^97. In order to reveal the factors most associated with home death itself, we turned to an examination of the last two years of the data set, 1996 to 1997. We tested the hypothesis that the variables in the literature were positively, strongly, and significantly associated with home deaths in Washington. Bivariate logistic regression was used to test the hypothesis because our dependent variable is binary and our independent variables are categorical. Moreover, the results (in the form of odds ratios (5) ) are easily interpreted, and it is a popular technique in geography and health sciences (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989) . A random sample of 50% was drawn from the most recent deathcertificate records, with n 3544, excluding missing data. The dependent variable (site of death) was dummy coded as`home death' versus`somewhere else'. The operational dependent variables gleaned from the literature that drew from the data set are listed in table 4, along with the frequencies of each of their values. Given the findings in the literature that middle-aged people and younger people are both, in general, more likely to die at home, a wide variety of age cohorts was included. The positive association between socioeconomic class and home death (albeit in specific research on cancer deaths) led us to dummy code higher status values both for level of education (college degree or higher) and for occupation (professional). (5) Odds ratios can be thought of as the ratio of an event happening to it not happening. If the odds are 50 : 50 then the odds ratio would be expressed as 1.0.
Note that several important dependent variables from the literature could not be tested through our data set. Important clinical independent variables`gender of caregiver',`symptom-control needs', and`survival time from diagnosis' simply are not recorded on death certificates in this state. Therefore, we were not able to consider the relations between these clinical-care factors and home death. We did, however, follow the lead of the literature, and used marital status as a proxy measure for presence of an informal caregiver (but see below). Bronchitis as a cause of death was eliminated from the model a priori because the number of cases (eight) was so small. The results of the model are given in table 5. It shows there is a strong, positive, and statistically significant association between home death and certain age groups, certain causes of death, and residential location. Age groups showed a particularly interesting pattern of association. All the age groups considered in the model (and in overall contrast to those older than 75) were positively and significantly associated with home death. The odds ratios ranged from 1.6 for the oldest group (65^74 years) to 1.93 for 45^54-year olds. Here two previous findings are supported. On the one hand, Cartwright et al's (1973) specific claim that those aged 45^54 are quite likely to die at home was confirmed. Simultaneously, Polissar et al's (1987) finding öin Washington specificallyöthat the 55^64 cohort was associated with home death especially, is also confirmed by recent data. Overall, middle age seems to be positively and strongly associated with home death.
Considering specific causes of death, the Washington evidence also corresponds with results in the wider literature. People with genitourinary cancers were approximately two and a half times more likely to die at home than people who died of all other causes. Individuals who died of cancers of the digestive organs and peritoneum were nearly three times more likely to die at home than people who died of all other causes. These specific forms of cancer were the strongest correlates with home death in the model. Turning to residential location, we find that decedents who lived in rural areas were slightly more likely (1.3 times) to die at home than were those who lived in urban places. Again, this association confirms findings in the previous literature.
Not all the variables, however, correlated with home death as expected. Perhaps most surprisingly was that, although being male is positively associated with home death, this association is weak and only significant at 0.046 (table 5)öthough recall that an earlier study in Washington State found no strong association between gender and home death either (Polissar et al, 1987) . Furthermore, as a cause of death, heart and vascular disease actually showed a negative and insignificant relation to home death, contrary to expectations from the literature. Another irony is that the model suggested that informal caregiver proxies (being married or being divorced) were both negative and insignificant. Measures of social status and class were positively associated with the dependent variable, and likewise not significant.
Given the unexpected results concerning gender and marital status, we speculated on the importance of possible interactions within the model (for example Bowling and Cartwright, 1982; Clifford et al, 1991; Hunt et al, 1989; Rosenberg and Short, 1983; Seale and Cartwright, 1994 ). Specifically, we tested for interactions among gender, marital status, and rural residence, but found no interactions to report.
The consensus in the literature, that cancers are generally associated with home death (Grande et al, 1998; Seale, 1991) , prompted us to consider its role in home death more closely. We reran the model inserting the more general category of``malignant neoplasms'' as an independent variable instead of the two specific forms of cancer. In our sample there were 802 decedents who died from malignant neoplasms, and 2752 who died of other causes. (6) The results of this second model are reported in table 6.
The overall trends in table 6 are broadly similar to those in table 5. Cause of death remains the strongest predictor of home death. The odds ratio for cancers in general was just over 2.3, similar to the ratios for genitourinary cancers and digestivep eritoneum cancers in the previous model, suggesting that it is not just specific forms of terminal cancer which are associated with home death. Again we tested for interactions, and found that there was a strong, positive, and significant interaction between being married and dying of cancer in predicting home death (B 0X404 SE 0X173, P 0X019, odds ratio 1X498, 95% confidence interval [1X068, 2.101]). Comparing the summary statistics of the second model with the first, we can see that there is actually an improvement in the model when`malignant neoplasms' is substituted for the more specific sorts of cancer.
Given that in several of the previous studies in the literature people dying of cancer specifically were used as the sample, and that social class variables were only positively associated in this group, we next fitted the model considering only those Washingtonians who died of cancer (802). Table 7 reports the results. It shows that only age cohorts are positively, strongly, and significantly associated with home deaths in this narrower population, and that, unlike the previous models for the general population, only certain age groups were significant. Those who died of cancer aged 55^64 years were approximately 2.2 times more likely to die at home than those who died of cancer at all other agesöjust as Moinpour and Polissar (1989) found for Western Washington cancer deaths. The 45^54 group was almost 1.9 times more likely to die at home; and those aged 0^34 and 35^44 in this population actually had a negative likelihood of home death. None of the other variables was significantly associated with home death in those dying of malignant neoplasms. It is particularly interesting that being married is not significant (P 0X559), and its odds ratio is below 1.0, given the interactions between cancer and being married in the previous two models. The contrast between the two populations (all decedents versus only those who died of cancer) affirms the argument in the literature that cancer is different from other causes of death with respect to death site. The Washington evidence suggests that the nature of this difference is in narrowing the range of associations with home death specifically.
To summarize, this analysis of home death in Washington State largely confirms the results of previous research on the topic, both locally and internationallyöalbeit with some notable exceptions. Considering recent deaths in Washington State, the factors identified in the international clinical literature as having the greatest statistical likelihood of being associated with home death were cancers generally, certain specific cancers (genitourinary and digestive ones), middle age generally, and rural residence. Across all deaths, the strong statistical association between 35^44-year olds and home death was unexpected. There seems to be an interaction between cancers and being married that especially increases the likelihood of dying at home. Factors predicted in the literature to be associated with home death included: being male, being married, being divorced, and heart or vascular disease as the cause of death. Although the literature tends to suggest that home death is most likely a male-gendered phenomenon, the lack of association found between the decedent's gender and home death echoes Moinpour and Polissar's earlier (1989) study of cancer deaths in Western Washington.
Critiquing the analysis of home death In the previous section we presented a foundationalist interpretation of the geography of death in Washington. Our purpose in this section is to critique and deconstruct it. Here we follow Rosenau's (1992) arguments that postmodern scholarship is typified by a relentless skepticism about scientific explanation because it is oriented more towards understanding than towards explanation. We start with the poststructural critiques of unsituated scientific and quantitative knowledges of human geography (most recently, see Barnes, 1998; Philo, 1998) . These critiques are by no means new or novel, but it is precisely because of their current purchase that we worry through them within the paper itself. The data and the results produced in the foregoing section do not`speak for themselves', nor is the reality which they describe unmediated simply because quantitative and unobtrusive methods are deployed (Porter, 1995) . In particular, three general points of epistemological critiques are raised. Each point is, to be sure, embedded in the others.
First, because we have used an essentially scientific approach, structure, method, and analysis, these data operate as a node in the exercise of biomedical authority. The resultant power/knowledge is characterized by singularly authoritative, scientific, generalizing, quantitative discourse circulating around health-care experts (Brown, 1995; Dorn and Laws, 1994; Kearns, 1995) . Our biomedical approach is witnessed by our situating the analysis in the context of a medical literature, our use of quantitative inferential analysis, and presumably valid and reliable data and categories, and the reception of these by biomedical scholars and practitioners. And indeed, we are not arguing that biomedical authority is categorically bad. Nevertheless, several troublesome consequences arise. Foremost, biomedical representations, like ours, so often speak louder and more definitively than do other ways of knowing about health and disease. With the biomedical perspective framing the literature and analysis, it becomes that much harder to see death as anything other than a biological process. Are there other ways that we might come to know the geography of home death? Who is being silenced, and to what extent is that silencing systematic? We contend that unless we escape the biomedical model, it is impossible to answer these questions. Here the difficulty of mixed methods might be raised. Although several authors have argued the need for qualitative methods in site-of-death research (for example, Field and Cassell, 1997; Tolle et al, 1999) , a foundational epistemology still delimitsöand prioritizesöthe sorts of knowledge that method can produce (objective versus subjective; facts versus impressions). Doing qualitative research within the biomedical model does not necessarily mean that we escape the foundationalism of science (Rosenberg, 1998) . The issue is not just a question of who might be silenced, or whose perspective might lack validity in the biomedical hegemony: it is that the grounds for posing and answering other sorts of questions are still presumed to remain within the biomedical model itself.
Compounding these political issues are problems with the claims of a seemingly Archimedean perspective that underwrites the authority of biomedical truth telling. On its own, the analysis above might well be read as a disingenuous form of unsituated knowledgeöa claim for an alleged objective perspective from nowhere or everywhere because truth by definition must be universal. Without epistemological room to situate us, this``God-trick'' (as Haraway, 1991 , calls it) is inevitably played. (7) The analysis above belies the very situated constructedness of home death itself throughout the train of conceptualization^operationalization^collection^measurement^analysisr eportage. (8) Indeed, specific criticisms are staked below that flow in part from this problem of biomedical authority.
Still another problematic effort of biomedical authority is witnessed in the effects and reception of our analysis of home death. Although we might mitigate our own complicity with this very critique, we cannot deny or diffuse itöin part because many of the workings of its power are beyond our control. Our results will become part of a health-sciences discourse on death, part of a literature on site of death that is already quite biomedicalögiven the organization of knowledge in the academy. It will draw on and feed back into biomedical hegemony that the means by which we have understood home death are largely unproblematic. Even if biomedical practitioners dispute our results, the foundationalism that allowed us to see relationships in home death will not be disputed. This very section of the paper, of course, is a modest attempt at destabilizing that authority, by admitting (though by no means transcending) the situatedness of our knowledge claimsöstill this is a point upon which it can be critiqued.
Second, our analysis can suggest statistical patterns and patterns of association, but does not allow us to say anything conclusive about social processes that are produced or maintained by those patterns (Porter, 1986; Pratt, 1988) . For that we need social theory (Kearns, 1993; ; see also Craddock, 2000) . Here we want to move away from the ad hoc explanations and narrow interpretations proffered in the literature on site of death that are tightly focused on patient choice, improved care, or efficiency. Those orientations remain fixed in a clinical discourse, even when they draw in broader social structures. Such modes of explanation öat least from the perspective of postmedical geography ötend to rely on and reinforce the point that the aim of research on death and dying is to improve patient care. Laudable as this goal is, the research can resonate more broadly, and there is a politics to that reach.
Following on from Milligan's (2000) and Kearns and Gesler's (1998) arguments, the change in the location of death from institutional settings to the home needs to be contextualized in a wash of economic, political, and cultural restructurings. Economically, the rising power of the Health Maintenance Organization and`managed care' insurance programs through the 1980s has commodified and rationalized health care enormously in the past decade, as well as reconfiguring labor practices of the health-care professionals who typically provided care for the dying (for example, King, 1999) . For example, recalling figure 1, we might be tempted to explain the decline in the early 1980s in hospital deaths as a consequence of changes in funding of end-of-life care in the USA (for example Field and Cassell, 1997, page 39) . In 1983, Medicare began to fund hospice care and private insurance companies followed suit (Miller and Mike, 1995) . Concomitantly, this federal insurance plan also reworked its payment scheme to hospitals and this had the effect to reducing use of inpatient hospital care. These wider changes might well have made it more economically rational in some (7) The next portion of this critique should situate our knowledge/production, at least in terms of political/theoretical issues that motivate this specific research project. For more explicit accounts of at least one of our positions, see (Brown, 1995; . (8) Within biomedical discourse several researchers have challenged the validity and reliability of cause-of-death entries on death certificates (for example Kircher and Anderson, 1987; Morton et al, 2000) . Equally relevant is the fact that several factors could not be rightfully included because of the structure of the data, or the requirements of our statistical techniques. Nevertheless, the analysis treats the phenomenon of home death as`out there', rather than as socially constructed.
instances to die at home, rather than in the hospital. But are changes in Medicare themselves the`cause' of a decline in hospital deaths, or are they part of a broader process of capitalist welfare state restructuring. Which is the cause? As our literature review makes clear, biomedical approaches to home death can more comfortably and readily trade in discrete phenomena such as policy change than in broader scale social processes (see also Rosenau, 1992) .
Politically, there has been a radical-democratic challenge to the hegemony of medical authority and top-down decisionmaking in patient care, exemplified by patients'-rights movements around cancer, AIDS, and terminal patients (Brown, 1997; Connelly, 1998; Mesler, 1995; Nash, 1977) . There has also been somewhat of a philosophical shift from cure to comfort within the intensive-care ward (Curtis and Rubenfeld, 2000) . Indeed, the very philosophy of hospice emphasizes a diverse care team oriented around the patients' wishes and comfort (Byock, 1977; Webb, 1997) . Evidence both from the USA and from the United Kingdom consistently shows that most people would prefer to die at home if circumstances permit (Kastenbaum and Normand, 1990; McCormick et al, 1991; Thorpe, 1993) , and physicians increasingly concur with this wish (Seamark et al, 1995) .
Culturally, there has been a challenge to the invisibility and denial of death in US society, most notably in the resonant popularity of Kubler-Ross's work (1970; see also Beresford, 1993; Palmer, 1993; Sankar, 1991; Webb, 1997) . Concomitantly, the aging of the baby-boomer cohort means that the group so well known for individuating itself through its consumption is now considering its own death in new ways. Tied to this cultural shift is that cohort's ever-increasing responsibility in caring and planning for its parents' health and terminal care (for example, Booth, 1999). These facts perhaps have helped to humanize the process of death, as people realize its inevitability. Likewise, the diffusion of the hospice movement from Britain to the United States in the early 1980s has provided new palliative orientations to caregiving for the dying (Buckingham, 1982) . The critical point in raising these theoretical reflections is not that they are hypotheses that should be tested with the data, but rather that our statistical representations are not self-evident truths. They must be countered with work on how we know these truths to be true, and their meaningfulness in a social context.
By way of one illustration, consider the evidence provided by a recent New York Times article about Carol Levine. She is an upstate New York woman who``struggled with her metamorphosis from wife to home nurse with little help from doctors, insurance companies, or the government'' when she became both a formal and an informal caregiver to her husband (Fisher, 1998) . A wife now does for free the caregiving work that used to be done in hospital by paid nurses. Her narrative is an example of``a fundamental shift in health care: families are performing an unprecedented amount of technical medical care in their homes, much of which would once have been provided by doctors or nurses alone.'' This story makes it easier to see the workings of post-Fordist capitalism and heteropatriarchyöand perhaps even a radical democracy of patients' rights movementsöimbricating to produce a shift in the location of terminal caregiving-cum-unpaid gendered labor. If men are not much more likely to die at home than women in Washington State, the gendering of caregiving is likely still an issue around home death. Indeed, women like Ms Levine might well be caring for mothers, aunts, or female partners. Perhaps gender and marital status of decedents are strongly, positively, and significantly associated with home deaths, but not in ways that were captured by the categories in the data, nor could be represented by a S-shaped logistic curve, or inferred from statistical inference (Gould, 1970) . As Barnes (2000, pages 663^664) would implore us, we must be wary of the epistemological premise that``the world itself and mathematics are fundamentally ordered according to the same arithmetic logic.'' (9) Third, we must recognize that the data set and statistical techniques have structured the way in which our interrogation of home death has been asked and answered. This point has certainly been raised elsewhere by Krieger who warns:`P ublic health data do not simply exist: the variables included or excluded from any given data set reflect the choices of individuals and institutions with the power to make these decisions'' (1992, page 427). Her remarks are certainly apposite to our study when we recall the potentially important independent variables such as clinical and informal care issues rendered unknowable by our data set. Her warnings also resonate in that we do not know a potentially important datum: whether the decedents held health insurance.
Yet this issue runs far deeper. Dixon and Jones (1998) explain the relation of poststructuralism to spatial science as a perpetual critical reaction to the fact that although the categories through which we represent the world often reveal, they always also conceal, and can be quite unstable. Their point typically is voiced in two registers: first there is the dilemma of logocentrism (the fixing of meaning in concepts). Second, there is the critique of dualisms that inevitably prioritize one item over the other, and obscure messy pharmakon (phenomena that are both and neither categories; phenomena that resist simple categorization). These workings must be understood as part of broader exercises and structures of power in society. So, at a rather less philosophical level, we can recognize a series of logical problems or confusions that are created by several key categories within the data set.
Perhaps the most important critique of logocentrism can be leveled at our dependent variable`home'. We only know its social geography from our own assumptions, and this goes against Kearns's (1993; compelling arguments for a postmedical geography that has a more nuanced understanding of place specifically. This variable only captures a domestic residential address; it does not convey the place of home. We have no information on whose home it is. We do not know if it is the decedent's home, nor do we know the decedent's relationship to the household head. These gaps and blind spots lead us quickly to question the cogent image through which we conceptualized the variable in the first place: What sort of place is`home' that makes it so theoretically distinct from a hospital anyway? Such silences potentially have enormous theoretical implications if, for example, it is the case that terminal care of parents is being given in the homes of adult children. They raise questions of gender and labor, and their placement in domestic space, and perhaps also questions of migration and kinship, too (Vitzez, 1997). Conversely, we imagine hospital settings to be antithetical to the social relations typically spatialized in`the home' but changes within institutional settings may well be taking place which complicate the hospitalĥ ome dualism (Curtis and Rubenfeld, 2000) . The categories used to fashion our geography belie the power relations that are spatialized through the locations they describe. Even with intrusive measures this may well be an especially difficult question to answer in light of Ms Levine's experiences, but also because of the rise in home-care and temporary-nursing agencies, not to mention the diffusion of portable medical technology.
(9) The danger of clinical myopia is also conversely that work on these issues within critical human geography will fail to be extended by a consideration of the geography of death. There are many critical geographies of the home, for example, that pivot on understandings of its spatialization of capitalism, patriarchy, and radical democracy, but none considers terminal caregiving and death. Reflecting on the research above leads us to ask in what ways might work in political, economic, and cultural geographies be extended by considering the shift towards home death as another spatialization of these social processes.
Put all too simply, we must question why`home' cannot be a logical operationalization for`control over death',`death with dignity', or comfort (see Sankar, 1991) , markers that allegedly make it a different place from`the hospital'.
No less bothersome is the fact that, although the certificate records site of death, we have no information of where people are dying (Field and Cassell, 1997) . The issue is one of logocentrically conflating event with process. One can imagine a situation where a person who spent months dying at home of cancer, being taken care of by family, then developed an infection and was taken into hospital for treatment where he or she then died. Conversely, one can imagine a situation where a person dying from a disease that requires prolonged hospitalization. Principally, professionals (nurses, physicians assistants, etc) do all the caregiving. Then, when death is imminent, the patient returns home to his or her family. In both stories, the coding for where the person dies is exactly opposite to where they were dying.
The significance of rural resident in the model (and in previous research on Washington) is potentially fascinating, but what this variable actually measures is unclear. Is it an issue of poor accessibility to a formal care facility? Is it a policy effect? Is it some set of cultural processes? Such conceptual questions are raised, but by no means answered, by this research. Moreover, the very meaningfulness of the category is far from clear. Jarosz and Lawson (2001) have noted a series of changes in rural Washington that challenge the cultural cogency implied by this independent variable. We can further question this logocentric independent variable even at an operational level. Morrill et al (2000) , for example, have recently argued against the census definitions of rurality (embedded in our data set) in favor of metropolitan commutating patterns. They argue that such a reconceptualization is a better reflection of the experiential, lived distinction between rurality and urbanity. The grounds on which we know that rurality is fully present in our measure of it is shaky at best.
The dilemma of pharmakon raises questions around our methodology, and the categories of hospice and informal caregiving. The very method of logistic regression demands the creation of dummy variables which a priori will divert attention from phenomena that are difficult to dichotomize, and/or will encourage shoehorning them into antonymic parcels for the sake of the statistical procedure (for example, table 4, far-right column). Specifically, we can imagine cases where the referents of each variable would be better understood as both/and, rather than either/or. We have already deconstructed the home/not-home dualism above, for instance. For the sake of brevity, however, just two other acute problems of this sort are considered below.
Hospice' presents an especially vexing pharmakon around the spatial categories of the data set. It can be a physical structure (albeit one that is typically not an institution in the same sense as is a hospital or nursing home), or it can be a philosophy of terminal caregiving that is employed either in the home or in the hospital (Beresford, 1993; Webb, 1997) . Unsurprisingly, there is no information about hospice-as-philosophy on the death certificates. The obvious pharmakon here is that we cannot distinguish home deaths with hospice care from those without hospice care, and this type of care has already been shown to be an important factor in predicting home deaths in Washington (Moinpour and Polissar, 1989) . Additionally, it becomes somewhat questionable to distinguish between hospital and home sites if both are possible sites of hospice-as-philosophy.
Yet, hospice is problematic in another way. Recall the fact that there has also been a 7.2 percentage-point rise in deaths occurring in nursing homes between 1980 and 1997, mitigating the significance of the trend towards home death. Bear in mind also that the presence of hospice care was found to be a significant predictor of home death for cancer patients in Washington State (Moinpour and Polissar, 1989) . Contacting the state nosologist, however, we found that hospices-as-physical sites (which often take the form of residential homes) are collapsed into the nursing-home site category. There is no ontological distinction in our data set between hospice and nursing home. Yet we can imagine scenes where the two sites enable rather different kinds of dying experiences and caregiving (for example, Beresford, 1993; Sankar, 1991; Thompson, 1994) . We have no way of knowing how much this increased percentage is a result of the rise of hospices as specific locational sites. Hospice is a troublesome pharmakon, morphing from philosophy to site within our data set, yet is exactly its`bothness' that makes it so geographically interesting.
In addition, we also worry about the operationalization of`presence of informal caregivers' as marital status, too. Although it certainly does reflect a common tack in the literature, this move is obviously heteropatriarchal in that it reproduces the assumption that in the main it is a spouse who does informal caregiving, and that heterosexual marriage is a standard family structure (Aiken, 1998; Stacey, 1990 ). Yet, surely informal caregiving would likely be an especially dense point on which postmodern families could be founded. Such a premise could be challenged by the experiences of people like Carol Levine in New York, or the growing numbers of baby boomers now caring for their aged parents (Booth, 1999; Vitzez, 1997) . Likewise, the assumed dichotomy between formal and informal caregiving seems rather illogical in light of Ms Levine's experience, and might also be constructed in the other direction: might`formal caregivers' provide informal care, too (Brown, 1997; Curtis and Rubenfeld, 2000) ?
In sum we argue that the foundational approach to the question of home death, which we practiced in the first section, is complicit problematically with the biomedical model, the power of which is based on an unsituated perspective, and the effects of which silence other ways of knowing about death. Second, spatial scientific analysis reveals patterns and correlations, but cannot address the social processes that produced them. It must be extended with theoretical work on political, economic, and cultural restructuring. This effort, of course, is doubly difficult if the biomedical model already frames death as a biological or clinical event. Third, our analysis was constructed with the aid of categories or representations that are far less stable than we had presumed. Critiques of the logocentrism and dualisms present in our terms show that our representations are far less stable than we might admit. These criticisms should not be taken to mean that the analysis was a waste of time, or that the tale it tells should be dismissed or ignored. They do, nonetheless, point to some of the problems in studying the geography of death.
Reflections
Reading the previous two sections of the paper side by side, we seem to want it both ways. On the one hand, we confidently claim the reality of a changed spatial pattern towards home death, and have attempted to explain that pattern through statistical analysis. On the other, we challenge the certainty and truthfulness of those very claims, as well as their theoretical paucity.``This is the truth; but it is not the truth.'' Where does such a contradiction leave us? Reflecting on the juxtaposition of the analysis and the critique, we follow Dixon and Jones's (1998) search for insights within this impasse, rather than presenting any simple solution to it. Thus, we outline below a series of scholarly, ethical, and political insights gained from the juxtaposition.
Foremost, addressing the divide between medical and postmedical geography, this experiment leaves us skeptical that any reconciliation can be achieved easily, especially if it is only attempted at a methodological or topical level. To be sure there is often an agreement between spatial science and deconstruction about the faultiness of data categories. But as Dixon and Jones (1998) so astutely point out, what that problem means for the two different kinds of geographers is quite different. For some, it is simply an issue of better data, the use of more precise categories, or accounting for error and variance. Even if that solution is practically impossible, there remains a premise of faith in some ultimately possible mirror representation. For the other, however, the cost of faith in that ideal is a deflection of effort and attention away from the inherent problems of our ironic faith in ever-faulty representations. On these grounds, then, the two scholarships in this paper are irreconcilable in that they are about different things, but also because they have different aims and relations to knowledge itself. This point has deep implications for arguments about the need for mixed methods, complementarity, and eclecticism ö at least within single pieces of academic writing. Such solutions are quite problematic if different methods are actually based on different theories of knowledge (see Lawson, 1995) . In this paper we have demonstrated why those hopeful arguments are easier staked than heeded.
In terms of the geography of death and dying itself, our juxtaposition nevertheless does serve to guide future steps at this early stage of the research project. However much our quantitative analysis begs deconstruction, it nevertheless provides relevant and focused starting points for the next phases of this research project (namely, a consideration of who tends to die outside the home, and an interpretation of the social geographies of each of these locations). For example, our figures and tables have become extremely useful talking points during the in-depth interviews with caregivers who provide local knowledge and thick description in the next phase of this project. Pragmatism or utility, however, are not necessarily the most truthful grounds on which to press knowledge claims.
Turning to the ethical insights that emerged in this experiment, we are struck by the sheer difficulty of the juxtaposition and the contradictions it produced. It would have been disingenuous for us to offer only an analysis or a deconstruction, or to place them in two separate papers. In a sense this tack would inevitably conceal the truths that our deconstruction raised. Conversely, if we only staked a deconstruction (say, of previous biomedical research on home death), we would have to admit a bit of dishonesty there too, as data and appropriate methods of analysis were at our disposal. We are aware of, and believe in, each of these methods and techniques, their strengths and weaknesses, and their broader philosophical underpinnings. To produce only a quantitative analysis, or to avoid it and to write a critical deconstruction of the literature, smacks of dishonesty. The insight here is that not only do we inhabit the debateöas decentered postmodern subjects the debate itself inhabits us.
We have exposed the well-worn dangers of the hubris and excessive confidence of science in its power to tell truth. Yet juxtaposing the two halves of the paper also reminds us immediately that we should be wary of a similar hubris emerging from poststructural critique, especially because it too is also a practice of representation ö no matter how perpetually self-critical it can be. Directly confronting our own irreconcilability itself leads to a truth about how we know and write geography presently. Critiquing our analysis did not solve the problems inherent in analysis itself; in some ways it merely reinstated the problem once again.
Finally, we are struck by the political insights this experiment has raised for us. The antifoundational epistemology of poststructuralism has been roundly critiqued for its political ennui (or worse), but there is political utility in juxtaposing two ways of knowing home death in such an immediate way. Broadly speaking, of course, the aim of this research is to abet`the good death' (Webb, 1997), but in a decided context of social justice and not just individual choice. And so we cannot even envision a politics of`the good death' without some sort of starting point about where death is taking place, or what factors seem associated with its new locations. Moreover, the discourse around our topic is very often hegemonically biomedical. We will invariably`use the master's tools' if we are to be heard on this medicalized subject. To deny science a priori would be politically imprudent, then. Yet clearly a politics emerges when we immediately force an interrogation on how we have known home death öespecially this interrogation does not take place within the foundational epistemology of science. In other words, our own politics of asking`what or where is the good death?' are honed by the juxtaposition because, in order to be agonistic, our politics cannot abide a single epistemology of death. They must also challenge how we even know our truths about the good death. However contradictory, the juxtaposition gives us what McDowell (1995, page 294) has called``principled positions'' from which we may consider whether or not (and for whom) these geographies may evince the good death as a biomedical, social, and thoroughly relational phenomenon. The good death from cancer for a middle-aged man in rural Washington may well be very`bad' for his female informal caregiver.
Moreover, the political insights from our juxtaposition take on an acute saliency in the context of health-care research in the United States. In a recent article, Satel (2001) dogmatically uses the mantle of science to insist that the questions of social justice have no bearing on health-care delivery. One of her immediate solutions to this political correctness' is to block resources to research on those sorts of questions. In her own words:`I suggest, for example, that the federal government cease funding research into the effects of`powerless',`classism,' and`racism' on heath;' these are virtually impossible to study in quantitative fashion'' (page 64). Given these sorts of stakes, the need to appreciate the irreconcilability of medical and postmedical geographies speaks to the politics of knowledge production, grants, and even academic freedom.
Conclusion
Our purpose in this paper has not been to argue for an integration or harmonization of medical and health geography. Nor has it been to provide any sort of final solution or way out of their debate. Rather, our purpose has been to detail explicitly some of the epistemological difficulties in achieving that aim within a single paper. In this way, we suggest that the nature of the debate is more extensive than being merely disputes over method or topical purview, but reflects a more profound dispute over the nature of truth and our relation to it as scholars.
By means of the case of home death in Washington State, we offered a foundational scientific analysis of the spatial shift away from hospital and towards home death. In relation to previous health-science research on sites of death, we then modeled a series of clinical and demographic variables that correlated well with home death. This analysis was juxtaposed with a poststructural critique of that analysis, which pivoted on the ability of our concepts, terms, and overall representation to mirror reality completely. A poststructural critique was offeredöbased largely around issues of pharmakon and unstable signsöthat challenged the truthfulness of our foundational, scientific, way of knowing home death.
Our experiment did not resolve the debate, however. We emphasized a key epistemological impasse around the presumption of a mirror correspondence between reality and our representations of it, which led immediately to different and irreconcilable aims. Reflecting on our efforts, we underscored the importance of recognizing the impossibility of ever reconciling these radically different perspectives because they are epistemologicalörather than merely methodological or topical.
Despite our failure to recognize or harmonize medical and postmedical perspectives, we reflected that there were nevertheless scholarly, ethical, and political insights gained from this experiment. Interesting and important truths were revealedöand sharpenedöabout the changing geographies of death in Washington State. The nature and depth of the debate in medical/health geography was clarified and, despite the inconsistency of the paper, there was a certain honesty to that inconsistency. Finally we recognized that both the analysis and our critical interpretations are useful if our research is to intervene in the politics of death and terminal care. Thus, this paper is not just a means to an end, but an end in itself. It has not only been about the changing geographies of death, but also about how we are to know and represent them well.
